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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

A Statement Of The Case Indicating Briefly The Nature Of The Case

This case involves constitutional challenges to Idaho Administrative Code Section
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. ("RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES") and the Idaho Industrial Commission's application of
that rule to three consolidated Workers Compensation Cases involving claims for attorney's fees.
The attorney's fees claimed are made by Claimant's counsel (real parties in interest herein) based
on contract, and not on equitable principles. The decisions under appeal rest on Idaho Industrial
Commission's application ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and.c to the facts.

2.

The Course Of The Proceedings In The Trial Or The Hearing Below And Its
Disposition

The three workers' compensation cases involved in this appeal were each settled on the
basis of a lump sum agreement. Upon submission of each Lump Sum Agreement to the Idaho
Industrial Commission for its review and approval, Appellant's law firm was notified by the IIC
that its fees on the LSA were denied to the extent of25% of the benefits under I.C. 72-408
attributable to each claimant's permanent impairment rating. Although IDAPA 17.02.08.033.a
requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the
requested fee is not reasonable" (see Appendix), the letters from the IIC Claims and Benefits
Section Manager simply conclude that attorney fees on an unspecified portion of the LSA "have
not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.01.08.33" without stating any reasons supporting
that conclusion. AR 33. Similar letters were sent out in Steinmetz, AR 456, and Gomez, AR 555.

In each of the three cases, Appellant's law firm filed a Request for Approval of Attorney's fees.
A hearing was held in each case at which Appellant's law firm stipulated that the fees sought
were not based upon any contention that Appellant's law firm met the standards of IDAP A
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17.02.08.033.01.a regarding "available funds" and stipulated that it did not contend that the
services of [its attorneys] operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which
the attorney seeks to be paid, as effectively required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii as applied
by the lIe. Appellant's law firm contended that it was entitled to the fees it claimed because
they are reasonable and based upon enforceable contract limited to the percentages allowed by
the IIC, and not upon equitable considerations resulting in a "charging lien" as contemplated by
the regulation. Appellant's law firm further contended that the IDAP A 17.02.08.033 is
unconstitutional.
The IIC denied the requested attorney's fees in all cases upon the grounds that
Appellant's law firm had not met its burden of proof under IDAPA 17.02.08.033 by establishing
that requested fees were from "available funds" as defined under the regUlation. Kulm, AR 245,
Steinmetz, AR 508, Gomez, AR 565. Appellant's law firm moved to consolidate all cases on
appeal, and filed this appeal. 1

3.

Statement of Facts

This case involves claims for attorney's fees equivalent to twenty five percent of benefits
attributable to the uncontested permanent impairment sustained by three workers' compensation
claimants represented by Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. All three Claimants retained Seiniger Law
Offices prior to any determination that they would sustain a permanent impairment, much less

1 The case of Cody Drotzman was also consolidated on appeal, however Appellant's law firm moved to
dismiss its appeal in that case, because in Drotzman, unlike the three remaining consolidated cases, the
Claimant expressed the need for the disputed funds. Appellant's law firm believes that when a manifest
conflict of interest arises by virtue of the lIC's present practice of partially approving LSAs and sending
out letters pronouncing that its fees are unreasonable (of which clients are naturally made aware) the
combination of its duty to put its clients' interests ahead of its own, and the threat to its reputation for
doing so, it has a duty to the profession and the client to relinquish any claim to the disputed funds except
in unusual cases. This is particularly true, because the decisions and orders of the lIC are a matter of
public record, available online, and are widely read by the workers' compensation insurance industry.
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that Defendants would agree to pay benefits attributable to any such impairment. While it was
certainly possible to speculate that each Claimant might be awarded a "PPI" rating, and that the
Defendants might agree to pay benefits with respect to such a rating, at the time that Seiniger
Law Offices, P.A. was retained, these eventualities "lay nascent within the womb of time."
The Written Fee Agreements

All three Claimants entered into written fee agreements with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
which are of record and identical for purposes of this appeal. Kulm Contingent Fee Agreement,
AR 7, Steinmetz Contingent Fee Agreement, AR 442, and Gomez Contingent Fee Agreement, AR

517. Each of the fee agreements provides for 1) the offer and waiver of the right to retain
Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. on an hourly basis, 2) a graduated scale of contingent fees ranging
from 25% on certain benefits obtained without a hearing, 30% of benefits obtained as the result
of a hearing and 40% after an appeal, and 3) the disclosure statement regarding normally
approved fees required by the IIC. See, Appendix - Key Provisions of Fee Agreements In All
Three Workers' Compensation Cases On Appeal.
Legal Services Provided

Each of the Claimants was provided legal services over a period of more than a year. See
Table 1 below. At the time Counsel became involved, Counsel regarded all issues as potentially
disputable because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a workers' compensation
case unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. Claimants sought the
services of Counsel as both counselor and advocate. As reflected in the IIC Form 1022 filings,
in addition to those services particular to each case Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. provided a wide
variety of legal services to the Claimants including counseling as well as representation. Kulm
IIC Form 1022, AR 1, Steinmetz IIC Form 1022, AR 434, and Gomez IIC Form 1022, AR 509.
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Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. provided legal services to each claimant over periods of time ranging
from more than a year and a half to over four years. For all practical purposes, Seiniger Law
Offices, P .A. was on retainer to spend whatever time was necessary counseling and representing
the Claimants for a fee that would not exceed the specified percentages of all amounts obtained
for the Clients after execution of the fee agreements. This meant that once Seiniger Law Offices,
P .A. contacted the Defendants and requested benefits be paid to it on behalf of Claimants, it
would be paid an amount equivalent to 25% of all benefits received (unless a hearing had to be
held in which case the higher allowed percentage of30% would be paid), though no attorney's
fees would be taken from any temporary disability benefits if the Claimant was receiving them at
the time of the execution of the fee agreement, unless the surety threatened to or did discontinue
those benefits.
During these time periods, Claimants had available to them virtually all of the resources
of Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. including two attorneys, one paralegal, and numerous support
staff. Counsel initiated each case by interviewing Claimants concerning the facts and
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and gathering of relevant information concerning the clients'
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history;
gathered additional background information regarding each Claimant as it related to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.; advised Claimants as to the procedures involved in
processing a claim for benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act; advised Claimants
as to the need for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission
Rehabilitation Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.; advised Claimants as to the disclosures
required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; created a database file for Claimants in which
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pertinent information was recorded for use in the handling of the claim; drafted appropriate
documents including a written fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the requirements
of the Idaho Industrial Commission, medical and employment releases, letters of representation
and inquiry to the sureties and the Idaho Industrial Commission, and letters to medical providers
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; reviewed all medical
records, employment records, and other requested documents as they were received. Throughout
the extended period of time that Appellant's law firm represented each client, its attorneys
consulted with Claimants about the status of their case on a periodic basis. Typically, the firm's
paralegal (and often one of the attorneys) had contact with the Claimants on at least a weekly
basis, coordinating medical appointments, the receipt of benefit checks, etc.

In each case, Counsel reviewed the Claimant's file in preparation for settlement, engaged
in extensive negotiations with defendants, had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions, advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs
that would be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical
providers, and advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
Counsel obtained compromise settlements with representatives of the defendants
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum
settlement agreement, completed portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum
agreement with Claimant. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining certain
cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel maintained
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an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to handle
whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his other
clients.

Claimants' Permanent Impairment Ratings
Each of the three Claimants sustained permanent injuries for which the surety paid PPI
benefits after Appellant's law firm had been retained. Claimant Kulm sustained a 5% whole
person impairment as a result of a protruded disk. Kulm LSA, AR 15. Claimant Steinmetz
sustained a lumbar injury requiring a microdiskectomy resulting in a 12% PPI rating, Steinmetz
LSA, AR 447, and Claimant Gomez sustained a 2.5% PPI as a result of an injury to her right
knee, AR 549. The impairment ratings were all awarded after Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. had
appeared as counsel for the Claimants.

The Lump Sum Settlements and Attorney's Fees
Each case was settled on a lump sum basis. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. claimed attorney's
fees on all monies obtained for the Claimants during the course of their representation from the
time of retention up to and including monies that were the subject of the LSAs, other than
medical bills and undisputed TTD benefits that were being paid at the time that it was retained
and continued to be paid without objection. During the course of representation, benefits were
paid and attorney's fees were claimed. The lIC followed its usual practice of reviewing the
Lump Sum Agreements, denying Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.'s requests for attorney's fees on
Permanent Impairment benefits that were not demonstrated to have been disputed, holding an
evidentiary hearing on those requests, and ruling on those requests by applying the "available
funds" standards contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
For purposes of this appeal, Appellant stipulates that his firm cannot prove that its
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attorneys were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial
impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for the lump sum
settlements in question. 2 Appellant stipulates that his firm did not meet the evidentiary standards
set by IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in all three cases consolidated herein, and that it is not contending
that the PPI benefits were "available funds" as defined by the regulation. Appellant so stipulates
so that the Idaho Supreme Court is presented with pure issues of law that do not involve the
application of the Commission's discretion. 3
ISSUES
Issues of Statutory Authority
1. Do IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and the present Idaho Industrial Commission practices with respect
to its review of the reasonableness of attorney's fees comply with its statutory authority?
Does I.e. § 72-803 or any other part ofIdaho Code Title 72 impliedly repeal I.e. § 3-205
that provides "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law
is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law."
2. Does Idaho Code 72-803 empower the lIC to limit attorney's fees to "disputed" matters under
the guise of regulation?
If it does, has the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the lIC?
Did the lIC exceed its authority in adopting IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq.?
3. Has the lIC erred in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033 to matters outside of its limited scope?
What is the scope ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033?
Appellant believes that this was also stipulated in all three cases below, since this was his intent, but so
stipulates herein to remove any doubt. See, e.g. Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee
Hearing, AR 467-468. "For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the
constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it
cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent
partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement
(LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test.""
2

Indeed, Attorney Alan Hull, counsel for the Defendants in Kulm, testified at hearing that the PPI and
disability benefits were paid as a result of the work done by Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., but his testimony
was not offered for that purpose.
3

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

-7-

Does the regulation relied upon by the IIC to deny Appellant's law firm's attorneys fee
claim authorize regulation of attorney's fees other than those claimed in connection with
disputed benefits?

Constitutional Issues
1. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate Claimants' rights under

the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the
Idaho Constitution?
2. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the guarantee of liberty
under Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13?
3. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the doctrine of separation
of powers by impermissibly delegating legislative authority to the Executive?
4. Does IDAPA 17.02.08.033 et. seq. on its face or as applied violate the doctrine of separation
of powers by invading the province of the Judiciary?

ARGUMENT
1.

Introduction

Since prior to Idaho becoming a state, the Idaho law has permitted attorneys and their
clients to determine the terms of their fee agreement. General Laws of the Territory ofIdaho,
Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 692, "SEC. 692. The measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but
parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements, as hereinafter
provided." See, Appendix - Early Statutes. Idaho became a state on July 3, 1890. As of 1909,
the law remained the same. Revised Code, Part 2 Title 14, Chapter 6, Sec. 4900. See Appendix
- Early Statutes.
By 1911, the statute had been amended to add a lien provision and a legislative
recognition that the right to contract as to the measure and mode of compensation was not
restrained by law: "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is
left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." Idaho
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Code § 3-205. 4 This statutory language effectively codifies what the doctrine of separation of
powers guarantees; the statute is recognition by the Legislature that it cannot restrain the practice
of law by limiting the right of a citizen to hire an officer of the Court upon such terms as to
which both may agree. Only the Judiciary has the "inherent power" to regulate and supervise the
practice of law. The legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest,
but in so doing, it acts in aid of the Judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of
the courts." Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,675,637 P.2d
1168, 1171 (1981). There is no question that IDAPA 17.02.08.033 does restrain the right of an
attorney and a client to agree on reasonable terms of compensation. Indeed, the lIC admits that
this is its very purpose. "It is undeniable that the current regulation impinges upon the right of
an injured worker, and his or her attorney, to make their own agreement as to how counsel

should be compensated." AR 247. (Indeed, if one accepts that it is not within the power of the
IIC to set legislative policy, the lIC has made an admission that it has over-stepped its
constitutional bounds: "Overriding policy considerations warranted the adoption of [these]
rules." AR 247.)

Prior to 1911, attorneys had "an equitable lien on a judgments procured by them", but ''the matter of
procedure, however, in the enforcement of such a lien is not uniformly established." Dahlstrom v.
Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 110 P. 243, 246 (1910). A statutory attorney lien was added (apparently to
the language set forth above) in 1911. "It will be noted this statutory lien is much broader than the
common-law lien. Under the common law the attorney had a lien for the amount of his services which
obtained as a retaining lien on all papers pertaining to the suit while they were in his possession, and also
a charging lien on the judgment as against the judgment creditor." Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 300 P.
362, 363 (1931). It would appear that the statutory lien was added to the pre-existing statutory guarantee
of the unrestrained (by law) right of an attorney and client to define the terms of their contract. In an
attorney fee case dealing with facts occurring prior to passage of the 1911 statutory lien, the Idaho
Supreme Court said: "On the other hand, our statute (section 4900, corresponding with section 1021, Cal.)
leaves the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys to the agreement, "express or implied,"
between the attorney and client." Merchants' Protective Ass'n v. Jacobsen, 22 Idaho 636, 127 P. 315,
317-18 (1912).
4

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
- 9-

This appeal presents as a matter of first impression a challenge to the statutory authority
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033,5 the lIC's "Rule Governing Approval Of Attorney Fees In Workers'
Compensation Cases". Also presented are constitutional challenges to the regulation. However,
because the Court considers challenges on constitutional grounds only if cases cannot be
resolved on other grounds, Appellant respectfully suggests that the lack of statutory authority for
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is clear, its conflict with I.e. § 3-205 manifest, and that this Court need not
reach constitutional issues, but should reverse the decisions below with the observation that the
Commission lacks the power to restrain the measure and mode of compensation of workers
compensation attorneys pursuant to I.C. § 3-205, which is a legislative acknowledgment that the
right of attorneys and clients to determine such terms is not "restrained by law" because it is not
within the province of the Legislature to do so. Appellant fears that anything less will simply
prompt special interests to run to the Legislature and seek the repeal ofI.C. § 3-205, inevitably
resulting in the same constitutional issues having to be submitted to this Court in a later appeal.
Appellant submits that the Legislature intended to include the language ofLC. § 3-205
acknowledging that the right to determine the measure and mode of compensation, not as a
reminder that no such statutory limitations existed at the time that the statute was passed, but
rather is included as a recognition that the restraint of this right is not a legislative function. Yet,
Appellant suspects that the lIC's response to this brief will demonstrate that it, at least, does not
so construe the statute. It would be helpful to all, if this were placed beyond cavil. Thus,
Appellant asks this Court to simply acknowledge what the Legislature has already declared,

5IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01-03 sets up a mechanism whereby an attorney can (and as applied must) seek
approval of fees (which is deemed a request for a "charging lien") in connection with the submission of
any proposed lump sum settlement. IDAP A 17.02.08.033.02. As construed by the IIC and, according
to it, this Court, approval can only be given with respect to attorneys fees incurred in connection with
disputed matters.
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which will fully resolve this appeal, and obviate the need to address the constitutionality of this
and any subsequent similar regulations that are not limited to simply determining the
reasonableness of attorneys fees without limiting their measure or mode.
As to the constitutionality of the portions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 that restrict the measure
and mode of compensation and the services for which an attorney can be paid, the regulation
interferes with First Amendment and due process rights and liberty interests of Appellant and his
past, present and potential clients. The First Amendment challenge to the authority of the lIC to
prohibit compensation for representation other than that relating to "disputed" issues is a matter of
first impression for this Court. The challenges based upon due process rights and liberty interests
concern the right to be compensated for work that may not necessarily result in additional benefit
to the workers' compensation claimant, previously vouched safe in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,
864 P.2d 132, (1993). The regulation, passed by the lIC acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, also
violates the doctrine of separation of powers by exceeding the limits of the lIC's quasi-legislative
powers and infringes both upon the legislative authority constitutionally delegated exclusively to
the Legislature, and the exclusive province of the Judiciary to regulate the practice oflaw. The
challenge that IDAPA 17.02.08.033's regulation of the character oflegal services for which an
attorney may be compensated in a workers' compensation case goes beyond the scope of Idaho
Code § 72-803 's delegation of quasi-legislative power to approve the reasonableness of attorney's
fees, thereby invading the province of the Legislature, also presents this Court with a matter of
first impression. In denying Appellant the attorney's fees in dispute in the lIC cases consolidated
in this appeal, the lIC misread Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139,868 P.2d 467 (1993), a
case that upheld a different and distinguishable attorney fee regulation against challenges to that
regulation'S statutory authority and constitutionality. Unlike IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the Rhodes
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regulation did not limit attorney's fees to "disputed" matters. Neither did Rhodes present a
challenge to the subject regulation based upon its clear conflict with Idaho Code Title 3 Chapter
2 dealing with the "Rights And Duties Of Attorneys" and specifically with the measure and
mode of attorney's fees, or a challenge based upon the First Amendment issues raised in this
appeal.

2.

What Is Not At Issue In This Case

Appellant believes that it may be helpful to an understanding of the issues that his firm
presents on appeal to recognize that which is conceded by it for purposes of appeal. Appellant
concedes that the following do not, in and of themselves, infringe upon his constitutional rights,
due process, or the separation of powers guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution:
1. It is within the police power of the Idaho Legislature to protect Idaho's workers from
being charged unreasonable attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases.
2. The Idaho Legislature can enact legislation limiting attorney's fees in workers'
compensation cases to those that are reasonable.
3. The Idaho Legislature can delegate to the Executive (in this case the Idaho Industrial
Commission) the power to enact valid regulations pursuant to which it may review
attorney fee claims in workers' compensation cases to ensure that they are reasonable.
4. Pursuant to the authority granted to the lIC by I.C. §72-803, it can review claims for
attorney's fees and disapprove any and all claims for such fees as are unreasonable. 6
5. A percentage contingent fee cap is not per se unreasonable and it is not per se
unconstitutional, though it does go beyond the lIC's statutory authority.
6. It is possible for the lIC to pass a valid regulation for the purposes of approving claims of
attorney's fees that takes into account whether the attorney "primarily or substantially"

6 "By definition, a contingent fee is both a contingency and a fee. Any time a fee is charged there exists
the possibility of overreaching by the attorney. To that extent, a contingent fee is like any other fee and is
subject to the same standards of reasonableness as any other fee." Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 261,265,629
P.2d 657, 661 (1981)
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secured an "available fund" of benefits for his client. Stated another way, it does not
violate either the Idaho or United States Constitutions, and it is not beyond the authority
ofthe lIC to consider whether the attorney "primarily or substantially" secured an
"available fund" of benefits in determining whether a claim for attorney's fees is
"reasonable. "
If the actions of the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho Industrial Commission were so limited,
Appellant would have no basis for this appeal, despite the fact that he might well have obtained
the same result below, and despite the fact that either or both the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho
Industrial Commission had acted in his judgment unwisely. However, there is a great difference
between disappointment and the denial of rights.

3.

What Is At Issue In This Case

Fundamentally, the attorney fee regulation in question, IDAP A 17.02.08.033, does not
simply create a procedure pursuant to the authority granted to the lIC by I.C. §72-803 for the
submission and "approval" of claims for attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases, or even
"regulate" such fees by setting a cap on contingent fees. IDAPA 17.02.08.033 goes further by
effectively and impermissibly legislating the types of services that a workers' compensation
claimant can retain an attorney to perform. This legislation goes beyond the power delegated to
the lIC by I.C. § 72-503 and 803, conflicts with the rights conferred on attorneys to determine
the "measure and mode" of their compensation with their clients conferred by I.C. § 3-205,
infringes upon Appellant's constitutional rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions,
and violates the Separation of Powers provisions of Idaho's Constitution. The regulation is
fundamentally different than the one upheld against similar, but not identical, constitutional
challenges in Rhodes v. Indus. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993).
As to Separation of Powers, Idaho's judicial department is uniquely imbued with the
power to regulate the practice oflaw. Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Util., 102 Idaho 672,
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675,637 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1981).7 "Where the practice oflaw intersects with a social system
such as the workers' compensation system, the judicial power does not merge, but remains
plenary. Any authority exercised by the other departments of government that affects the practice
of law must not conflict with judicial resolution." Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139, 141,
868 P.2d 467,469 (1993). As will be demonstrated, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 not only violates the
doctrine of separation of powers as regards the authority and province of the Judiciary, it also
does so as respects that of the Legislature.
At bottom, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 effectively creates an irrebuttable presumption that all
attorneys' fees other than those claimed as a result of prevailing on a disputed matter are
unreasonable. In direct conflict with the teachings of Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132,
(1993), IDAPA 17.02.08.033 as applied prohibits an attorney and his or her workers'
compensation client from agreeing that the attorney will be paid for acting as a counselor, or for
lending the force of his experience, skill, professional reputation, and the resources of his office
to the workers' compensation claimant, or for tactically or strategically heading off a dispute
over benefits, or otherwise. Ironically, notwithstanding the strong judicial policy in favor of
settlement, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 creates an incentive for the attorney to polarize the client's
case by filing a complaint the minute that he is retained, so that he will at least have some idea of
what was disputed at the time that he was retained, since years hence, the sole issue that he is
likely to have to litigate is his right to attorney's fees. Yet, even that tactic is likely destined to
accomplish little, since most of the issues that arise in a workers' compensation claim are not
7 It would appear to follow logically that if only the Judiciary can "regulate" the practice of law, any
"regulation" passed by a coordinate branch of government ought to at least reflect the Judiciary's
recognition of the factors of reasonableness discussed with respect to I.C. § 72-804, not under
consideration in this appeal, and could not interpose impediments to the retention by a Claimant of an
officer of the Court unrelated to the reasonableness of the fee agreed to by the attorney and his client.
See, Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132, (1993) Fn. 4.
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necessarily presented at the time of retention, but at points in time generally well beyond the
time that the attorney was retained, from whence the reasonableness of an attorney fee agreement
must be judged "prospectively rather than retrospectively." Curr, 693, 139. Fn. 4, see, also,

Clarkv. Sage, 102 Idaho 261,263,629 P.2d 657,659 (1981).

4.

IDAPA 17.02.08.033 Exceeds The lie's Statutory Authority

Under well-established Idaho law, IDAPA 17.02.08.033, I.C. § 72-508 (granting the lIC
authority to adopt rules and regulations "not inconsistent with law") and I.e. § 72-803
(subjecting claims of attorneys to the approval of the lIC) must be read in conjunction with I.e. §
3-205 and construed so that the statutes are harmonized if possible. Courts have been said to be
under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done:
Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. [Citations omitted.]
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. When there
are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible ... The
intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.'

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2483, 41 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1974). 2B
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 53: 1 (7th ed.). When the validity of a legislative act is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that courts must first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
concurring); Supreme Court Interpretation ofStatutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53
Colum. L. Rev. 633 (1953).
"If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there
would be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate
representation. Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain
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exceptional and well-qualified counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that
courts foster and protect the ability of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his
choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice which would discourage [such]
representation .... " See also Jennings v. Gabaldon, 97 N.M. 416, 640 P.2d 522
(N.M.App.1982); Dobbins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 280 So.2d 582
(La.App.1973 ).

Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 17,684 P.2d 990, 994 (1984). Hogaboom, while
not controlling with respect to claims for attorney's fees under I.C. 72-803, and Curr both reflect
the long standing position of this Court that the relationship between the reasonableness of
attorney's fees and the ability to obtain counsel and to practice law are intimately intertwined.
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is an unprecedented departure from this tradition, in that the regulation
does not confine itself to the adoption of a process for determining the reasonableness of an
attorney fee.
Appellant is not aware of any authority for the proposition that the adoption of I.C. §72803 providing for the approval of attorney's fees impliedly repealed the I.C. § 3-205 express and
unequivocal prohibition against limiting the freedom to contract of an attorney and client: "The
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement,
express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law." IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in fact
outlaws fees for all legal services other than those rendered with respect to a dispute and sets up
a "charging lien.,,8 "It is presumed the legislature does not intend to make any changes in the
existing law beyond that which it expressly declares." Rydalch v. Glauner, 83 Idaho 108, 115,
357 P.2d 1094, 1098 (1960), (Knudson and McQuade, dissenting).
It has long been the law of Idaho that "[T]he repeal of statutes by implication is not
Interestingly, one of the Industrial Commissioners has queried in casual conversation whether claims for
contingent attorneys fees may be barred by the anti-assignment language ofLC. §72-802. Such a concern
only arises if one assumes that the lien created by I.C. § 3-205 is not to be read in pari materia or
otherwise harmonized with the Workers Compensation Act.
8
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favored. In the absence of express terms, it will be presumed that the legislature did not intend by
a later act to repeal a former one, if by a fair and reasonable constitution, effect can be given to
both. To overcome such presumption, the two acts must be irreconcilable, i. e. clearly repugnant,
as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent
operation." [Citations Omitted.] State ex rei. Goodv. Boyle, 67 Idaho 512, 523-24,186 P.2d
859,866 (1947). See, also, Golconda Lead Mines v. Neill, 82 Idaho 96,101,350 P.2d 221, 223
(1960).
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow,
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum. "Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will
not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment."
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d 290,301.
"The reason and philosophy of the rule is, that when the mind of the legislator has been
turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general
terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the
original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive
previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a
construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all." T. Sedgwick, The
Interpretation and Construction o/Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874).

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153,96 S. ct. 1989, 1992-93,48 L. Ed. 2d
540 (1976). Emphasis supplied. No one can seriously argue that the passage ofI.C. §72-803
contains a clear intention to repeal the right of a lawyer and his client to enter into an agreement
defining the terms of the lawyer's engagement. In no way are the right of an attorney and client
to agree on a reasonable fee pursuant to I.C. § 3-205 and the power of the lIC to approve fees
I.C. § 72-803 repugnant, a point that was not discussed in Rhodes. Since I.C. § 72-803 did not
repeal I.C. § 3-205, the lIC lacks statutory authority to limit the measure and mode of a worker's
compensation attorney's compensation other than upon the grounds of reasonableness.
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5.

The Adoption of IDAP A 17.02.08.033 As Construed And Applied by the IIC
Violated The Doctrine of Separation of Powers As Regards Both the
Judiciary and the Legislature

In adopting IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the IIC clearly exceeded its power under I.C. § 72-803
and transgressed into both the realm of legislation, exclusively reserved to the legislature, and
the regulation of the practice of law, exclusively reserved to the Judiciary.
While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the legislature,
(Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15) "the legislature may constitutionally leave to
administrative agencies the selection of the means and the time and place of the execution
of the legislative purpose, and to that end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations."
State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78 P.2d 125, 128 (1938). Administrative agencies do
this by enacting rules and regulations. See Idaho Code tit. 67, ch. 52.
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410, 414 (1990)

This Court, speaking through a number of eminent jurists, has rather consistently defined
the nature of that which results from rules and regulations adopted by executive agencies
by virtue of authority delegated to such agencies from the legislature.
Sullivan, J., speaking for the Court in Idaho Power Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 141
P. 1083 (1914), described the authority delegated by legislative act by quoting language
from the United States Supreme Court contained in Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194,32 S.Ct. 436, 56 L.Ed. 729 (1912):
[T]he congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but,
having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall
proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to
particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in
a particular matter within the rules laid down by the congress.
Continuing, the Court quoted Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294
(1892), as follows:
"The true distinction," as Judge Ranney, speaking for the Supreme Court of Ohio,
has well said, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a [sic.] discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
William A. Lee, J., spoke for the Court in State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 649, 228 P. 796,
797 (1924), as follows: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to
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any other body or authority."

Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664-65, 791 P.2d 410, 414-15 (1990). Emphasis supplied.
Clearly, there is a huge distinction between delegating to the lIC the power to determine the
reasonableness of attorney's fees, which violates neither the province of the legislature nor the
Judiciary, and delegating to the IIC the power to determine what services an attorney may be
compensated for whether the charge is reasonable or not. It is a distinction that from a
constitutional perspective makes all of the difference in the world.
The bottom line is this: There are only two logical possibilities. Either the Idaho
Legislature did not delegate the power to repeal I.C. § 3-205's statutory protection of the very
rights that Appellant also contends enjoy some constitutional protection ("The measure and
mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or
implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law."), or it did delegate that power to the lIC.
If the Legislature did not delegate such authority, the regulation is void as going beyond the
lIC's statutory authority. Ifit did delegate such authority, that delegation was unconstitutional
under the doctrine of separation of powers.
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 violates the doctrine of separation of powers as to the Judiciary
because it limits compensation to "disputed" matters and thereby regulates not just fees but
effectively the areas of law that an attorney may practice.
The Idaho Constitution grants to this Court the judicial power of the state. Idaho Const.
art. 5, § 2. Article 5, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution limits the legislature's power when it
involves state courts exercising their judicial powers. It states in pertinent part:

§ 13. Power of legislature respecting courts.-The legislature shall have no power
to deprive the judicial department ofany power or jurisdiction which rightly
pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the
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methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the
Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this
Constitution .... (Emphasis added.)

Holly Care Ctr. v. State, Dept. o/Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 81, 714 P.2d 45,50 (1986). The
steady onslaught of so-called "tort reform" has perhaps desensitized some with respect to the
constitutional issues implicated by legislative limitations on attorney compensation. However,
Appellant believes this Court would conclude that the legislature had strayed over the line and
attempted to "deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains
to it as a coordinate department of the government. " if the legislature were to pass a law that no
one with a net worth of less than $100,000 could hire a lawyer under the guise of an exercise of
the police power, or that no corporation could hire in-house counsel because of a concern that the
counsel would not be independent, or that Defendants could not hire counsel in workers'
compensation cases because relief is to be sure and certain and the legislature as a result of
"exhaustive study" had determined that defense counsel undermined that goal,

6.

IDAP A 17.02.08.033 Violates Appellant's And Claimants' Rights Under The
First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Rhodes did not address a First Amendment challenge. The lIC has apparently determined
that workers compensation claimants must be protected from having to pay for the advice of
counsel and representation by counsel in "undisputed" matters. 9 The First Amendment protects
the right to petition an administrative agency. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking

Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,92 S. Ct. 611, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1972). The ability to pay even a non-

9 In an informal conversation with one of the lIe's "claims consultants", Appellant raised the point that he
felt entitled to be paid for advising his clients as to all manner of matters that might not be presently
disputed but which were critical to future benefits that might become disputed. Appellant was advised
that this was what the claims consultants were for, and that Appellant should simply refer his clients to
the claims consultants for such advice and counsel.
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lawyer to speak on one's behalf carries with it First Amendment implications. Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1988).10 The existence of commercial
activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the
First Amendment. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474, 86 S.Ct. 942, 949, 16 L.Ed.2d
31 (1966). As evidenced by the IIC Form 1022s in the record, Appellant's law firm was retained
to provide legal advice, and represent the Claimants both formally before the IIC and to speak
for the Claimants in communications with the representatives of the Defendants. Speech is
protected even when "in a form that is sold for profit." Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 433 U.S.
350,363,97 S. Ct. 2691,2699,53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977). One would assume that if the
informational value of lawyer advertising were worthy of constitutional protection, the right to
be paid for legal advice actually given once the lawyer is retained and representation commenced
would also merit such protection.
Even though the speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such
speech in certain contexts. See, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct.
1918,23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed.
1093 (1940). The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free
flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising,
though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues
of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975).
And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices
of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
603-604,87 S.Ct. 1224, 1242-1243, 18 L.Ed.2d 303 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and
reliable decision making. 425 U.S., at 761-765,96 S.Ct., at 1825-1827.
Bates, 364,2699. Emphasis supplied. It cannot be seriously argued that Appellant's right to
advertise the fact that he is available to give legal advice enjoys constitutional protection, but his
Meyer was decided in the context of public political speech, yet Appellant submits that property
interests in workers compensation benefits and right of his clients to petition the lIe in this and other
10

cases are of analogous stature.
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right to give the advice and his clients' rights to receive that advice is not. In this regard, both
the rights of the Appellant and his clients are violated by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.

7.

IDAP A 17.02.08.033 Is Unconstitutional As Applied

The challenges raised by this appeal implicate two prior cases dealing directly with
constitutional challenges to the actions of the Idaho Industrial Commission, and additional cases
that have impacted that of the lIC.

Currv. Curr
In Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 Pold 132, (1993), counsel for four Workers
Compensation Claimants successfully challenged the lIC's practice of sua sponte reducing the
percentage of the attorney's contingent fees in the absence of applicable regulations, notice or an
opportunity to be heard. This Court held:
"The Commission's procedural misconduct is compounded by constitutional
transgressions. The Commission has waded into regulatory conduct with indifference to
constitutional requirements that adhere to rights fixed by a private contract. An attorney
fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and appellants performed
services for their clients in reliance on the terms of the fee agreements. It is clear that, in
Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract
that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. Cleveland Bd of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105
S.Ct. 1487, 1495,84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Application ofForde L. Johnson Oil Co., 84
Idaho 288, 372 Pold 135 (1962). In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. Jones v. State Bd of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P.
491 (1923).

Curr 691, 137. Emphasis supplied. In analyzing Curr, this Court observed
"The Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has specifically
granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited jurisdiction, with nothing being
presumed in favor of its jurisdiction." See Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n,
102 Idaho 744, 750,639 Pold 442,448 (1981). * * * Under I.C. § 72-803, the
Commission has a duty to approve or disapprove attorney fee claims. The basis for
approval depends upon a finding that the fee agreement sails the wake of reasonableness.
Reasonableness, in tum, derives from the totality ofthe circumstances from the
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perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made. * * * As a
creature of legislative invention, the Commission may only act pursuant to an enumerated
power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and regulations properly
issued by the Commission under I.C. § 72-508. * * * In acting beyond the bounds of its
statutory authority the Commission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and has
manifestly abused its discretion.

Curr, 690-691, 136-137. In other words, assuming that the Idaho Supreme Court correctly
construed I.C. § 72-803 in Curr, the IIC was delegated the power by the Idaho Legislature to
determine whether attorney's fees are reasonable in workers' compensation cases, but not
necessarily the far greater power reserved to the Judiciary to determine the categories of services
for which an attorney can be compensated. Only the Judiciary can determine what constitutes
the practice of law, and concomitantly for what services a lawyer acting always as an officer of
the Court can charge a reasonable fee.
The importance of this distinction is reinforced by this Court's observation:
In effecting the attorney fee modifications under the claimed authority ofI.C. § 72-803
where there is no fee dispute, the Commission is acting in its quasi-legislative as opposed to
its quasi-judicial capacity. The Commission must accordingly act within the bounds of its
legislatively delegated authority and of the omnipresent mantle of the United States
Constitution.

Curr, 691, 137. Emphasis supplied. To this the undersigned would add that the fee agreement
enjoys the same, or perhaps even more robust, protection under the doctrine of separation of
powers contained in the Idaho Constitution. "The right to follow a recognized and useful
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13," vouched safe by Curr, would mean little
if the Legislature or Executive could effectively void that guarantee by passing a law or
regulation declaring it illegal to pay for such services. Although the right to contract is not
infringed where a contract entered into subsequent to the passage of valid regulations is limited
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by an otherwise lawful regulatory environment, the same is not necessarily true (as assumed by
the lIC) with respect to the liberty interest of the attorney to enter into a contract pursuant to I.C.

§ 3-205, particularly in view of the lIC's failure to observe Curr's teaching as to the point
beyond which neither "regulation" nor "approval" may go:
Specifically, the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize efforts that
do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or
procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made
suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes oftheir clients, thereby seriously undermining the
attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new money" provision preempts representation
other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-508.

Curr 692, 138. Contrary to the interpretation given Curr by the IIC, the analysis in Curr is not
limited to the procedural infirmities of the IIC's sua sponte reduction of attorney's fees.
Although Curr required the IIC to cure the Contract Clause and Due Process Clause deficiencies
of its sua sponte practices by adopting valid procedures regulating the reasonableness of
attorney's fees, it did not hold that all such procedures were constitutionally valid even if they
infringed on the substantive rights contained in the foregoing passage. The foregoing passage in

Curr demonstrates it is beyond the lIC's power to "fail to compensate an attorney for acting
solely as a counselor," to "fail to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as
obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment rating," and to "[preempt]
representation other than in disputed matters [in contravention of] I.C. § 72-508." Curr, 692,
138. The clear implication of Curr is that the IIC could not do this because it had not been
delegated that power by the Idaho Legislature by virtue of the adoption ofI.C. § 72-508, and
because doing so violated the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation as protected by
a constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. By limiting attorney's fees to "disputed" matters, IDAP A
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17.02.08.033 flies in the face of this constitutional prohibition.
Finally, Curr mandates "Under the terms of1.C. § 72-803, the Commission upon making
the threshold determination of unreasonableness must fix (approve) attorney fees." Curr 693,
139. (Emphasis in the original.) Curr noted that the reasonableness factors articulated in

Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13,684 P.2d 990 (1984), and Clarkv. Sage, 102
Idaho 261,629 P.2d 657 (1981), "offer helpful, but not determinative, factors to be thoughtfully
considered when ascertaining reasonableness." Curr, 690, 136. Reasonableness, in tum, derives
from the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee
agreement was made. Curr 690, 136. As applied by the IIC (and according to it this Court) the
present regulation deals with the Hogaboom and Clark reasonableness factors essentially by
eliminating them other than with respect to fees generated from "disputed" matters. I I As to
compensation for "an attorney for acting solely as a counselor," "efforts that do not generate
monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment
rating," and "representation other than in disputed matters" IDAPA 17.02.08.033 effectively
determines a priori any such attorney's fees are per se unreasonable by prohibiting them.
Rhodes v. Indus. Comm'n
Contrary to the IIC, Rhodes does not support the constitutionality of IDAPA

17.02.08.033. Rhodes declared that the issues it was addressing were:
1. Whether the Commission has exceeded its statutory authority by enacting a
comprehensive regulation governing attorney fees for claimants' attorneys.
II. Whether the regulation enacted violates the United States Constitution or the Idaho
Constitution.

II "'Reasonable' means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be satisfied from
available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(e).
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Rhodes 141,469. Though the majority opinion in Rhodes does not identify or set forth the

regulation at issue, the dissent written by Justice Trout does:
The specific regulation at issue provides:
4. Maximum attorney fee to be charged by a claimant's counsel. After the effective
date of this regulation, any contingent fee agreement between counsel and a claimant in a
workers' compensation case shall provide that the amount of attorney fees will not exceed
25% of any new money received by the claimant, whether such new money is acquired
pursuant to a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, other Agreement, Mediation, or an
award of the Commission.
a. Provided, however, that after hearing by the Commission and upon its own
motion, the Commission may award attorney fees up to 30% of new money
awarded.
b. In cases where a claimant is deemed totally and permanently disabled, attorney
fees may be deducted from no more than 500 weeks of workers' compensation
benefits.
Rhodes 143,471. The confusion of the lIC as to the import of Rhodes is understandable, because

despite Curr's prohibition against limiting attorney's fees to "new money," that exact term was
used in the regulation under consideration in Rhodes. Justice Trout's citation to ~4 of the
regulation under consideration in Rhodes did not include the definition of "new money"
contained in ~3:
3. "New Money" defined. "New money" as used herein shall refer to monetary benefits to
the claimant that counsel is responsible for securing through legal services rendered in
connection with the client's workers' compensation claim.
IDAPA 17.01.01.803D. AR 247. Emphasis supplied. "Secured" as used in this definition most
closely means to "succeed in obtaining" (Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th Ed) or
"to get hold or possession of; procure; obtain" (http://dictionary.reference.com), or "to put
beyond hazard oflosing or of not receiving" (Merriam Webster English Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary). The regulation at issue in Rhodes did not limit an

attorney's right to be paid to "disputed" matters or "available funds" "primarily or substantially"
secured by the services of the attorney. In effect, the regulation at issue in Rhodes was a
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percentage cap on attorney's fees on the moneys paid out pursuant to a negotiated settlement or
as the result of a hearing in which the attorney acted to "secure" his client's rights to such funds.
The "new money" was simply all of the money received by the Claimant "secured" by the
negotiation of a lump sum settlement, at mediation or at hearing. 12
This distinction is a critical one because despite the characterization of worker's relief
being "sure and certain," no workers' compensation claimant's right to benefits is ever "secure"
in the sense in which that word was employed in the regulation under consideration in Rhodes.
In most workers' compensation cases the claimant's rights to future benefits unfold over
a period of months or years, and are influenced by factors that often cannot be ascertained at the
time that the attorney is employed, when it is often unknown if the injury will be permanent, how
long the claimant may be on medical leave, what the claimant's future medical needs will be,
whether the claimant will need retraining, or how any permanent medical condition may impact
the claimant's access to the labor market. The Defendants retain the absolute right to contest all
of these factual issues unless admitted, which they seldom if ever are at the outset of a case. 13

12 Indeed, this is how IDAPA 17.02.08.033, the regulation under consideration in this case, was
interpreted until most recently: "We -- the present stance with regard to what benefits are recoverable and
what constitutes disputed, have changed. Okay? And the reason that that's important is that the Supreme
Court has said that one of the Constitutional requirements and rights that we have is that there are clear
guidelines as to what we are entitled to take a fee on. Now, I have done this for about 30 years and since
Kerr [sic.] was decided and the new regulations were passed, up until about a year ago it was possible to
pass the threshold with the claims consultants simply by saying -- they said, well, give us a letter that
shows that you requested the impairment rating and that's satisfactory. Okay. The present decision and
what we get out of the -- the informal determination is that that is no longer enough. That we have to
show, number one, that there is a dispute and we have to show, essentially, that we overcame the
wrestling match. Okay? Now, if these are to be clear guidelines, it is impossible for both of those
interpretations of the same regulation to be correct." Testimony of Appellant, Transcript of Kulm
Hearing, p. 261. 24 to p. 271. 18.
13 As the record reflects, the fee agreements entered into between appellant and his clients provides: "If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the execution of this agreement, Attorney
will not take a percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an impairment rating which has been admitted
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The vast majority of workers' compensation cases are settled through the Lump Sum process.
As a result of the negotiation of a Lump Sum Agreement, the Claimant's unliquidated and
generally contestable claim to statutory benefits is liquidated and converted to an enforceable
contract right.

14

Under the definition of "new money" in the regulation under consideration in

Rhodes, negotiation of the Lump Sum Agreement secured the monetary benefits. In contrast, the
artful definition of "available funds" contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a) as applied simply
resurrects the constitutionally invidious limitation of attorney's fees to "new money" as that term
was employed in Curro
Appellant is aware that the lIC relies primarily on Rhodes in support of the attorney fee
provisions of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.

Despite the fact that the decisions under appeal herein

discuss Rhodes at length, rather than anticipate the lIC's contentions in this regard, Appellant
will reserve additional discussion of Rhodes for his reply brief.

Mancilla v. Greg and Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp.
The lIC relies on Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 688, 963 P.2d 368,371 (1998) and

and is being paid, Attorney will not take a percentage of the balance of the impainnent rating unless it is
later disputed." AR 7, 442, 517.
14 Appellant respectfully suggests, and hopefully without appearing to be presumptuous, that it may be
productive for the Court in this case and in others in which attorneys fees are at issue, to place some focus
on the concept of the liquidation of a claim. "Liquidated", as defined by Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009) means "(Of an amount or debt), settled or detennined, esp. by agreement." "liquidated claim"
means" 1. A claim for an amount previously agreed on by the parties or that can be precisely detennined
by operation of law or by the tenns of the parties' agreement. 2. A claim that has been detennined in a
judicial proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Whether in the context of workers
compensation or other areas such as the application of the Common Fund Doctrine, it is generally the
establishment of the client's or another's rights to a fund of money through the liquidation of a claim and
the creation of a contractual right to fund or the right to execute on a judgment that confers the real
benefit on the client or other beneficiary. Though collection of the obligation remains, as a practical
matter in the vast majority of cases the monies are paid by an insurance company, and the real
accomplishment by the attorney was the liquidation of the claim by negotiation of the settlement or the
victory in Court.
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Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000) in support of its construction
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033 as prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees other than with respect to
"disputed" matters. Neither Mancilla nor Johnson raised the constitutional challenges to IDAPA
17.02.08.033 raised herein, but together they evidence the appropriateness of this Court seriously
considering such challenges in this case. Mancilla involved an unsuccessful challenge to the
lIC's exercise of discretion in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033. The Mancilla Court simply held
"Based upon a review of the entire record, we hold that there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that Pena did not primarily or substantially
assist in securing the PPI award." Mancilla 688-89, 371-72. Mancilla is significant, because it
construed IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and 01.e to prohibit "undisputed funds" from being used to
satisfy claims for attorney fees, though the lIC has acknowledged that this construction may be
dicta. AR 221-222. 15
In upholding the lIC's exercise of discretion in Johnson, the Court reasoned "All of this
testimony supports the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed at encouraging Boise
Cascade to accept full responsibility for the medical bills related to the two later surgeries, which
they questioned but fully accepted immediately after consulting with outside counsel, not as a
result of anything Pena did." Johnson 353, 738. The implication of this observation, is that an

A careful reading of the 17.02.08.033.0 1.a and 01.e makes it clear that the regulation does not, by its
terms, prohibit attorneys fees from being paid from undisputed funds other than those "not disputed to be
owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney." If anything, the regulation permits attorneys
fees to be taken from funds "not disputed to be owed" subsequent "to claimant's agreement to retain the
attorney." "It is a universally recognized rule of construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies
certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State
Legislature of the State, 142 Idaho 640,642, 132 P.3d 397,399 (2006). Interpretation begins with an
examination of the statute's or rule's literal words. State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825,827, 172 P.3d 1100,
1102 (2007); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a
rule is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the rule as written, without engaging in construction.
In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 479, 210 P.3d 584,587 (Ct. App. 2009).
15
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inference arose from the timing of Boise Cascade's acceptance of responsibility that it acted on
the advice of counsel. As a matter of judicial policy, requiring the showing apparently mandated
by Mancilla should be avoided because it invites the invasion of the Defendants' attorney-client
privilege to the extent that Defendants either offer proof that they paid benefits on advice of
counsel, or offer such an inference. Ifit is the workers' compensation claimant's attorney's
burden of proof to overcome such inferences, he should be permitted in discovery to inquire into
all aspects of the motivation ofthe adjuster in agreeing to pay a benefit, including any
communications with counsel that were a part of that motivation. Since Defendants are liable for
paying punitive attorney's fees for unreasonable denials of benefits under I.C. § 72-804, they are
unlikely to admit that benefits were paid only as a result of the demands of workers'
compensation claimants' counsel, and have every reason to contend, and likely believe, that they
paid such benefits purely because they independently recognized their obligation to do so.
Troubling implications arise from placing the burden of proof on workers' compensation
claimants' counsel to prove after the fact, particularly after a confidential mediation, what was
disputed as a predicate to recovery of any attorney's fees, and allowing evidence from the
defendants that they relied upon the advice of counsel in deciding to pay such fees without
dispute, or similar inferences, without allowing the attorney seeking fees to test the credibility of
such evidence and inferences.
For these reasons, though the judicial policy implications of IDAPA 17.02.08.033 do not
directly raise constitutional issues, they do impact the analysis of whether or not IDAP A
17.02.08.033 in its present form and application goes beyond regulating the reasonableness of
attorney's fees and intrudes upon the broader plain of the regulation of the practice of law
reserved exclusively to the Judiciary under the separation of powers provisions of the Idaho
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Constitution.

8.

IDAPA 17.02.08.033 As Construed In Johnson Intrudes Upon The Province
Of The Judiciary And Conflicts With Judicial Policy By Creating Ethical
Problems Directly Affecting The Practice Of Law

Requiring attorneys after the fact to justify their attorney's fees solely on the basis of
whether or not all of the fees claimed are derived from the recovery of "disputed" funds, creates
problems that directly effect the practice oflaw that Appellant respectfully suggests should be of
enormous concern to this Court. "The principle that neither the legislature nor the executive can
in any way regulate or alter the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is basic to the doctrine of separation
of powers. Idaho Constitution, art. 2, § 1." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 663, 791 P.2d 410,
413 (1990). One of the ways in which this Court regulates the practice oflaw is through the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. LR.P.C. 1.2(c) provides: "A lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives
informed consent." Iflawyers in workers' compensation cases can only be paid with respect to
disputed matters, presumably they can limit the scope of their representation to disputed matters
pursuant to LR.P.C. 1.2(c). However, such a dichotomy of roles, while plausible in the abstract,
would create a hornet's nest of ethical problems in practice, not only for claimant's attorneys, but
for the attorneys representing the Defendants.
Suppose that an attorney agrees to represent a client in all disputed matters in connection
with a pending workers' compensation claim shortly after the worker suffers an accident. At the
time that the attorney is engaged, the Defendants are paying the claimant's medical bills and
have begun to pay time loss (TTD) benefits. However, it is almost always the case that the
duration, if not the extent, of the injury is the subject of speculation. So too, it is generally
unclear what position the Defendants will take as to whether or not they will pay an impairment
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rating, or how much, if any, disability above impairment they will agree to pay, or for how long
they will pay time loss benefits, since defendants often obtain an Independent Medical
Evaluation to justify cutting off those benefits even when the treating physician whom they have
a right to pick has not released the patient.
Indeed, at the moment that a potential workers' compensation client sits down for the
first interview with the attorney, there is almost never any guarantee that any benefits will
continue, and the defendants' right to contest all future benefits or even request reimbursement
for past benefits is open to them. In reality, in many cases nothing is disputed when the lawyer is
first consulted, yet the workers' compensation claimant distrusts the representative of the surety
or the employer or both and wants to hire counsel. The lawyer explains to the potential client
that pursuant to 17.02.08.033.01 he can only be paid with respect to disputed matters, and drafts
a fee agreement advising the client that the scope of his engagement is limited to such matters.
The client agrees to sign the agreement, but has questions about the workers' compensation
process. The lawyer explains that he would love to help the client, but because the fee
agreement can be orally modified by implication, he must decline to answer questions about
anything that does not go to a disputed matter. The lawyer declines reluctantly, because he
knows from decades of experience that cases often are won or lost based on matters that have to
be finessed, and which are beyond the ken of laymen unfamiliar with the workers' compensation
system. Most of these are individually small matters, such as what to be aware of when
attending a so-called independent medical examination; what to be cautious of when giving a
statement to a representative of the defendants; the way to interact with human resources if the
claimant feels that he is not able to work within the restrictions given by his physician; what it
means when a van with tinted windows parks across the street for prolonged periods; how to
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remind the employer of its duties under the ADA and FMLA that are implicated by the
claimant's medical condition; or anyone of a thousand other matters that typically arise in such
cases, to say nothing of the ceaseless struggle with sureties to pay claimants their time loss
benefits promptly.
The attorney then contacts the defense counsel. He advises her in writing that he has
been engaged to represent the workers' compensation claimant only with respect to disputed
matters. He further advises defense counsel that it is his understanding that there are no disputed
matters at present, and that defense counsel is therefore free to communicate exclusively with the
claimant until such time as a dispute arises, and that he leaves it to defense counsel to determine
for herself when a dispute has arisen. Then, and only then, is the defense counsel to
communicate with him, but as to all matters which remain undisputed, defense counsel is to
continue to communicate directly with the client. The attorney advises defense counsel that he
apologizes for the inconvenience, but because he does not want to expand the scope of his
representation implicitly, he is going to have to insist on this, and he warns defense counsel that
she should not construe this request to in any way relieve her of her ethical obligations under
LR.P.C. 4.2, stressing that he only consents to direct communications with the workers'
compensation claimant as to undisputed matters.
As the Court can easily appreciate, such a scenario would be a nightmare for defense
counsel, and it is not as far fetched or fantastical as might be imagined. Indeed, one of the
Commission's "compensation consultants" has suggested to Appellant that he simply allow them
to counsel with the claimant as to all undisputed matters. Appellant recalls the late Idaho
Supreme Court Justice Alan G. Shepard's playfully sardonic observation offered to young
lawyers that one really did not have much understanding of what it meant to practice law for the
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first ten years out of law school. Indeed, it took Appellant ten years to fully appreciate the truth
of Justice Shepard's observation, and the rather comic yet spectacular naIvete demonstrated by
the compensation consultant's suggestion reflects the aggressive and uninformed posture towards
claimants' counsel that appears to be becoming institutionalized within the lIC.
As a practical matter, Appellant would not attempt to limit the scope of his representation
to disputed matters, though it certainly would not seem unreasonable to him if other attorneys
did. However, what the Appellant is being forced to do, is to tum down claimants who distrust
their employer, believe they are being set up by the surety, and are more than willing to pay an
amount as attorney's fees to be taken from their impairment rating whether disputed or not for
the peace of mind of having an attorney. Of course, Appellant's response to such a scenario is
not relevant to the issue of whether 17.02.08.033.01 impacts the scope of feasible employment
and its implications under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but he offers his thoughts
because the slow and steady attempt to get lawyers out of the workers' compensation field, and
the indifference to such consequences evidenced on page 42 ofthe Findings of Fact and

Conclusions ofLaw Relating to Counsel's Request for Approval ofAttorney's foes, AR 245,
should be of grave concern to this Court and to any lawyer who has taken an oath to "never
reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."

9.

The Regulation in Question Impacts Fundamental Rights In A Way That
The Regulation In Rhodes Did Not

Rhodes was decided applying a "rational basis" test rather than a heightened standard.
"Because the challenged regulation creates no suspect or invidiously discriminatory
classification and entangles no fundamental right, but involves economic and social welfare
legislation, it must be tested under the restrained standard of equal protection review, the familiar
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rational basis test.,,16 Rhodes 139,470. Reading Rhodes and Curr together, Rhodes' assertion
that the regulation Rhodes considered did not do any of the things proscribed on constitutional
grounds by Curr is telling. Reading Rhodes and Curr together, the Rhodes Court implicitly
concluded that the subject regulation did not abridge the substantive rights declared in Curr; that
is, the regulation did not prohibit compensating "an attorney for acting solely as a counselor" or
"fail[s] to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission
for medical care or procuring an impairment rating" or make "suspect appellants' integrity in the
eyes of their clients, thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship" or "preempts
representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-508." Curr 692,

l38.
Unlike IDAPA 17.02.08.033, under consideration in this appeal, the regulation in Rhodes
did not prevent an attorney from being paid attorney's fees other than with respect to the
recovery of disputed benefits. A single example illustrates the difference between the two
regulations. Under the regulation challenged in Rhodes, a workers' compensation claimant
16 Since the Fourteenth Amendment discussed in Curr extends the protections of the Fifth Amendment to
the states, the following language is instructive:

'(T)he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the
Fifth Amendment * * *.' Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411,3 L.Ed.2d
1377. That right is therefore also included among the '(i)ndividualliberties fundamental to American
institutions (which) are not to be destroyed under pretext of preserving those institutions, even from
the gravest external dangers.' Communist Party of us. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
U.S. 1,96,81 S.Ct. 1357, 1410,6 L.Ed.2d 625.

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 270, 88 S. Ct. 419, 427, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967), (Brennen,
Concurring.) See, also, Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623; Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,
352, 75 S.Ct. 790, 800, 99 L.Ed. 1129 (concurring opinion); cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,
350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10,60 L.Ed. 131;
Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-590, 17 S.Ct. 427,431,41 L.Ed. 832; Powell v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684, 8 S.Ct. 992, 995, 1257,32 L.Ed. 253.
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offered a Lump Sum Settlement could hire an attorney by the hour to review the agreement,
advise him as to the wisdom of entering into it, and negotiate with the surety by proposing a
counter offer. Once the negotiated Lump Sum Agreement was approved by the lIC, nothing in
the Rhodes regulation would prohibit the claimant from paying the attorney, as long as the fee
did not exceed the 25% limitation. Pursuant to the IDAPA 17.02.08.033, an attorney could not
be paid a fee for such services. In view of both I.C. § 3-205 and common sense, can this really
be what the legislature intended in passing I.C. § 72-803, the plain language of which simply
authorizes the lIC to "approve" attorney's fees? Indeed, as IDAP A 17.02.08.033 is presently
construed by the lIC, it would appear that an attorney is not even entitled to be repaid costs or
disbursements out of the proceeds of a lump sum settlement unless he can demonstrate that the
funds to be paid in consideration for the settlement were paid as the result of the resolution of a
"dispute." (See the definition ofa "charging lien" in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(c).)
Appellant respectfully suggests that when it comes to laws and regulations effectively
controlling the practice of law, a higher standard should be utilized by this Court under the Idaho
Constitution because the right to follow a recognized and useful profession of the practice of law
is a fundamental right protected by a liberty interest, and because the regulations violate the
separation of powers in three ways: Judiciary vs. Executive, Judiciary vs. Legislative Branch,
and Legislative Branch vs. Executive.
The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference
with fundamental rights and liberties. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117
S.Ct. 2258, 2267-68, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1997). In addition to the freedoms explicitly
protected by the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that other rights
may be fundamental and subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. In order to determine whether
a right is fundamental, a two-step analysis is undertaken. Id. First, the right must be
shown objectively to" 'be deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed,' " Id. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 787-88
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(quoting Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-38,52
L.Ed.2d 531,539-40 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,58 S.Ct. 149, 15152,82 L.Ed. 288, 292 (1937». "Second, [the Court has] required, in substantive-dueprocess cases, a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Id In
determining whether a right is fundamental, "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking.' " Id
(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117
L.Ed.2d 261,273 (1992».
State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 933-34, 231 P.3d 1016,1030-31 (2010), reh'g denied (May 5,

2010).
CONCLUSION
The importance of the issues presented by this case cannot be more eloquently stated than
has already been done by this Court:
It is our belief that this legislative intention to insure adequate representation and claim
prosecution requires the award of reasonable attorney's fees. Were the fees of attorneys to be

kept artificially low, i.e., below market value on a per hour basis, the result would be a
migration of legal talent away from this crucial area and a chilling effect on the ability of
claimants to obtain representation. As the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated in Herndon
v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434, 435 (1978):
"If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there
would be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate
representation. Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain
exceptional and well-qualified counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that
courts foster and protect the ability of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his
choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice which would discourage [such]
representation .... "
Hogaboom 17,994. 17 Emphasis supplied. Though the common sense observation of this Court

in Hogaboom that those who cannot pay an attorney a fair amount for his services will not be
able to retain such services was essentially dismissed as speculation by the Rhodes Court (as was
the testimony of attorney Alan Hull in this case by the lIC, see Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm
Hearing Transcript p. 61. 14 to p. 101. 10, p. 161. 7 to p. 171. 11, and 181. 15 to p. 20 1. 12,
17 The statute under consideration in Hogaboom was I.C. § 72-804, and not I.C. § 72-803 as in this case.
Yet this distinction would not appear to undermine the logic of the quoted passage.
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excerpts of that testimony contained in the Appendix to this brief, and Order on Claimant's

Motion/or Reconsideration atAR 431-432), the relationship between and the ability to obtain
legal services and the payment of adequate compensation therefore has long been a simple matter
of judicial inference. In light of the Judiciary's historical recognition of the relationship between
reasonable attorney's fees and the ability to obtain legal services, this Court should not tum a
blind eye to the testimony of veteran workers' compensation defense attorney Alan Hull that the
IDAPA 17.02.08.033, or at least the IIC's present interpretation of it, has resulted in an increase
in workers' compensation claimants who cannot obtain counsel, made it more difficult to resolve
such cases, and resulted in claimants who have the right to benefits simply giving up.
Appellant respectfully submits that this case needs to be resolved by going back to the
basics. The regulation of the practice of law is a matter within the sole province of the Judiciary,
which has historically regulated compensation on the basis of reasonableness. I.e. § 3-205 not
only recognizes the Judiciary's exclusive province in this regard, but enshrines it in statute by
commanding that the "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law."
Nothing in I.C. § 72-803 indicates that the legislature intended to repeal I.C. § 3-205 or limit its
application in the field of workers' compensation law, and nothing in either statute conflicts with
the other. That there is a will on the part of the Executive to limit the measure and mode of
compensation is beyond cavil, but the difference between political will and constitutional right is
fundamentally the very reason for both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The IIC's
interpretation of Rhodes suggests that we are drifting to a pass at which the constitutional
guarantees recognized in Curr are guarantees only so long as there is no political will to
overcome them. In its view, Curr's prohibitions had meaning only until a regulation did away
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with them. Appellant does not believe that constitutional guarantees are as ephemeral as
principals of common law, subject to change as each new opinion issues. Curr and Rhodes must
be harmonized, just as I.C. § 3-205 and I.C. § 72-803 must be harmonized.
The decisions in these consolidated cases denying attorney's fees must be reversed
because the IIC lacks the statutory authority to limit attorney compensation to only those
"services of the attorney [that] operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which
the attorney seeks to be paid." Such authority was never delegated to the IIC by the legislature,
and if it was, that delegation of power violated the doctrine of separation of powers both as to the
Judiciary and the legislature. IDAPA 17.02.08.033 violates fundamental First Amendment,
Substantive Due Process, and Liberty rights protected by the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.
Appellant requests that the decisions in the consolidated cases be reversed, that IDAP A
17.02.08.033 be declared to be beyond the statutory authority of the IIC or, ifnot,
unconstitutional, and that the Commission be ordered to consider approval of the reasonableness
of the attorney's fees claimed using the Hogaboom and Clark factors, or the factors contained in
I.R.P.C. 1.5, or whatever factors this Court, exercising its sole prerogative to regulate the
practice oflaw, deems applicable to the limited quasi-judicial function the IIC is empowered to
perform by I.C. § 72-803. Appellant will stipulate that the IIC may do so in the absence of a
valid regulation appropriately enacted within the constitutional and statutory limits of he IIC's
quasi-legislative authority, knowing full well that the relatively small amounts directly at stake
on this appeal at this point are far behind the financial point of no return, even if awarded on
remand. Though the legal object of this appeal necessarily involves the recovery of those
disputed attorney fees, the appeal was not motivated by a desire to recover them. Appellant's
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motivation is simply this: For over thirty years, his firm has never turned down a workers'
compensation client because there was not enough money to be made on the case. Even if the
injury was small, the benefits to be derived limited and uncertain, and the time required to be
committed to holding the hand of an often uneducated layman who felt overpowered, distrustful
and unequipped to handle his or her own workers' compensation case would not justify the risk
of resources, Appellant did not turn such cases down if there was any possibility, however slight,
that there would be at least a small impairment award at the end of the case from which he could
charge a fee. In hundreds of small cases, as in those in this appeal, Appellant's firm has
dedicated their time and resources over periods of years, to such workers' compensation cases.
Usually, at the end of the day, the compensation has been adequate. Despite the advice of most
of Appellant's peers in the Bar, there has been no attempt made to screen worker's compensation
cases to select only those that are most likely to result in significant remuneration. This
Appellant has done, as have all who have worked in his firm, with a sense of pride, service to
both the clients and the profession, and an understanding that it is a privilege and an honor to be
asked to represent someone who is injured, worried about their future, and willing to repose their
trust in Appellant's firm. It is because the principles presented by this appeal are dear to the
attorneys and staff in Appellant's firm, that they are worth contesting before this Court; the
money involved is insignificant, and it is almost certain that Appellant's firm could make more
money in the future by simply screening cases and refusing to accept small cases with no express
denial of benefits, than by prevailing here and containing to do so.
Appellant does not suggest that this has been by any means heroic. However, he does
respectfully suggest to the Court that he has done so in the firm belief that it is what has
historically been expected of officers of the Court, and that handling cases on a contingent basis
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comports with the aspirations of the judiciary as articulated above in Hogaboom. If the lIe's
power to limit representation to disputed matters is confirmed, Appellant's ability to handle
small cases in which there mayor may not be any permanent disability will be diminished. No
attorney can handle a workers' compensation case on an hourly basis. No client can even hire an
attorney to assist him on an hourly basis to review and finalize a Lump Sum Agreement and pay
the attorney out of its proceeds, and every governmental entity will be free to "restrain by law"
the ability of attorneys and clients to agree to the measure and mode of their compensation.
Thus, what is at stake in this appeal truly is the regulation of the practice oflaw, and not just the
reasonableness of attorney fees.
As requested in the introduction to the argument section of this brief, Appellant asks this
Court to simply acknowledge what the Legislature has already declared, which will fully resolve
this appeal, and obviate the need to address the constitutionality of this and any subsequent
similar regulations that are not limited to simply determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees
without limiting their measure or mode.
Respectfully submitted January 6, 2012.

"Will Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Appellant
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Dated January 6, 2012
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APPENDIX

1.

Key Provisions of Fee Agreements In All Three Workers'
Compensation Cases On Appeal

Waiver of Hourly Fee Representation
"Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein. I have read the foregoing and decline to
retain the attorney on an hourly basis, this
day of _ _ _ _ __
200
[Claimant], Client."
Percentage Contingent Fee
"For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be
in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portion will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client
after execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a
hearing. If Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at
the time of the execution of this agreement, Attorney will not
take a percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety
discontinues or threatens to discontinue payment of said
benefit; if Client has received an impairment rating which has
been admitted and is being paid, Attorney will not take a
percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless it is
later disputed.
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved
after an appeal has been filed by either party."
Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to
lack of cooperation by Client."
The Disclosure Statement Required by the Idaho Industrial Commission.
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"In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case
in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a
hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a
higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if
you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition
the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. I certify that I have read and understand
this disclosure statement and Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms
, 200_
contained herein. DATED this _ _ day of
[Claimant], Client"
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2.

Excerpts from Testimony of Alan Hull Taken From Kulm Hearing
Transcript

MR. HULL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm here today to support Mr. Seiniger's claims
and I'd like to give you a little background. A number of years ago I was called by then
Commissioner Gettes to serve on a hastily assembled committee -- I think it was Jack
Barrett and myself and I believe Jerry Goicoechea and Bob Huntley, to look at attorney
fees, because they were getting a lot of pressure from then Governor Andrus. He wanted
to reduce claimant's fees. What had happened was the legislature was in the process of
dropping the -- reducing the Medicaid and I believe Medicare reimbursement rates and
there was a family practitioner in Twin Falls who was the only doctor in Twin Falls
taking these patients and she had got a lot publicity and the governor told us I'm going to
have to reduce the rates on the doctors, because of budget constraints and I'm going to cut
the lawyers, too. We negotiated for two or three days by phone, he was back east at a
national governor's convention, and this rule was eventually adopted and the 25 percent
attorney's fees came out at that time.
Since that time we went over the law the Medicare and Medicaid rates have gone
up, because people have not been able to find doctors to treat them. Since that time in my
practice what I see are a lot more pro se claimants, because they cannot find attorneys
who can represent them and I think when you -- anytime you cut a fee that an attorney
has a part in earning, you're making that more and more of a problem for those people to
find attorneys and, quite frankly, they tend to be thrown to the wolves in this litigation
process.
Whenever I have a pro se attorney I also ask for a status conference with the
hearing officer assigned to the case, they go over the rules with the claimant, they are told
that you're expected to abide by all of our rules and you will be held to the same standard
as an attorney would be and at that point most of them just drop it.
This -- this procedure is supposed to be simple and as summary as possible. It is
not doing that. We are denying the ability to get counsel for so many claimants.
In this case, as I understand it, Mr. Seiniger was hired on 5/30/07. A PPI rating
was rendered by Dr. Beth Rogers on 11/7/07. There are a lot of factors that go into every
case and in this case I was assigned to draft the lump sum settled. But in every case now,
because of the Sixth Edition, and the ability of the Sixth Edition to end up in a zero
percent impairment, even when you do a cervical fusion. I had a case involving that. The
selection of a PPI doctor, the input they get from both sides, and whether or not a
claimant's attorney are going to go out and spend their own money on a physician to do a
rating, are critical to the recovery of a claimant. It's hard to tell a claimant's attorney to
go out and spend two or three thousand dollars getting a rating and restrictions when you
can't even be paid for what they are getting and I think by assuming -- and it appears to
me that's what staff is doing in this case is assuming the PPI ratings are not the result of
efforts of counsel, instead of assuming that anything that's generated after counsel
appears should be presumed to be that which counsel earned and only deducted in the
event that the -- showing that counsel did nothing to do that. I think by doing that you're
denying people the ability to get counsel and because of that you're denying them a
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hearing that's as simple and summary as possible and this is a growing trend and I would
urge you to look at how your interpreting the rule or, if necessary, to go back and actually
examine the rule and rewrite it.
But the interpretation is up to you and we didn't see the interpretation where it's
presumed that PPI wasn't subject to attorney's fees until about 12 years ago. I think that's
a very dangerous presumption, because the PPI ratings can set up the entire case and an
attorney should be compensated for the work they do in getting that to be sure that that
claimant has available to him or her every benefit possible under the system. And by just
-- what it looks like summarily saying you're not entitled to PPI, even though you have
been in the case for five months before it was awarded, is simply not a reflection of
reality how these things work now. And this is particularly true now with the Sixth
Edition where the rating can be zero and I actually had two level fusion, cervical, that
came out zero and claimant agreed. He said I'm perfect. He had an impairment on his
shoulder, so he could settle the case. But this is a critical step and I think it's a step that is
causing claimant's lawyers to turn down questionable cases and those are the people that
probably need representation the most.
So, I would urge you to interpret your statute -- your rule as there is an assumption
on anything that comes -- is generated after counsel is retained is earned and let them take
a fee out of that, if you need to go back and reexamine your rule. And if you look at the
Hildebrand case, which is 1984 IC 0368, it certainly shows the duty on this Commission
to continuously be reexamining your rules and your statutes for Constitutionality. Thank
you. I'll be happy to answer any questions and I'll certainly stay for the hearing.
Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 6 1. 14 to p. 10 1. 10.

But I don't think that you can assume that these are necessarily controlling precedents,
because I don't think the court has looked at what is the impact of that in the ability of
people to find lawyers. You know what the government's done when people couldn't fmd
doctors, they raised the rates for reimbursement. What are we going to do now? And
these people are not doing well in these hearings, in spite of the best efforts of the hearing
officer and in spite of the best efforts of the Commission, and I don't see anything in the
IDAP A that requires one interpretation over the other. That was the case went up to them
in each of those cases. I think this Commission needs to look at what is the impact of this
and I think it ought to -- personally -- do you assume if it comes in, the benefit was paid,
it wasn't awarded before and if it was awarded and paid after counsel comes on the case,
you need to assume that they had something to do with it. What are you going to do in a
case now --let's assume a person appears they may have no impairment or ten percent
and you know that ifthere is an impairment there is a very large disability. Are you
going to tell the attorney you can be hired, but only for the disability and we don't expect
you to pay money to get an impairment rating, we are not going to pay you back for that
effort. That's wrong. You know, it's just -- the interpretation is not working and I think
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that it's time for this Commission to reexamine that and I think we all know that the court
just reacts to what it gets, so Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 16 1. 7 to p. 17 1. 11.
MR. HULL: First of all, let me refer to the court's language, because I think they knew
the attorney who was before them in that case. So, I don't know that that case really
stands for much of anything, other than they don't -- didn't like that attorney and he's no
longer an attorney. Oftentimes in my practice I have seen adjusters and even sureties
strongly recommend or insist that claimants go see an attorney to get the thing resolved.
We all recognize the value of having an attorney on the other side, because oftentimes
these cases can't get resolved that should be resolved until that happens. If we make it
impossible by artificially eliminating what they may be receiving, we are not going to
have that ability to do so and people are going to uncompensated that should be
compensated. It clogs up the system.
Having said that, I'm not suggesting that you have a carte blanche rule, I'm
suggesting just utilizing -- if you want to use a calendar approach, a presumption that the
person did something and certainly when you have a rating out there of 12 percent you
have a real incentive to go out and get one you know that's going to be lower and pay it.
In most of these cases, you know, with disability -- I don't care whether it's two percent or
12 percent, because impairment -- disability includes impairment. The question is is
there a rating and are there restrictions. That's what determines the value of these claims.
And I think these attorneys are earning their fee and the proof of that seeing the kind of
people who don't have attorneys and to me it's really increasing.
I always ask the person at deposition, you know, have you talked to an attorney.
Yeah, I've talked to an attorney, they wouldn't take my case. What happened? I was just
told just go ahead and file and they will take care of you. I'm not being taken care of.
People don't realize they are getting into a litigation process where, you know,
you look at the attorneys doing it, everybody's experienced in this. It's almost like you
get an attorney that doesn't do it, they need to hire a workmen's comp lawyer, because we
are -- this is a -- people have a hard time understanding this system and harken back to
the words of the court in Fowble, well, generally the Fund, if you buy a policy from
them, pay benefits -- they were talking about the second injury fund. So, I understand
that, you know -- I think the court reacts to what the Commission presents to it and the
reasoning of the Commission. And if we may have to plow new ground here, I don't
have any problem -- you know, suggesting you should, but I think you should.
Testimony of Alan Hull, Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 181. 15 to p. 20 1. 12.
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Ch.6.

COSTS

267

to the service of a summons or other process, or of any paper to
bring a party into contempt.
Historical:. Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 4894.
C. C. P. 1881, Sec. 690.
California Legislation: Same: C.

C. P. 1872, Sec. 1016; Deering's Code.
lb.; Kerr's Code. lb.

Service by Telegraph.

S.ec. 4895. . Any summons, writ, or order in any civil suit or proceeding, and all other papers requiring' service, may be transmitted
by telegraph for service in any place, and the telegraphic cOpy of
such writ, or order, or paper so transmitted, may be served or executed by the officer or person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and
returned by him, if. anyreturn.be .requisite, in the .same manner,
and with the same force and effeCt·· in all' respects, as the 'original
thereof might be. if delivered to him, and the officer or person serving or executing the same has the same authority, and.is subject to
the' same liabilities, as if the copy were the briginal. . The original,
wl1en a writ or order, must also be filed in the cO,urt from which it
was issued, and a. certified copy' thereof. preserved 'in' the' telegraph
office from which it was sent. In sending it, either the original or the
certified copy may be used by the operator for that purpos!'l. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph bears a seal, either pri"ate ,()J:: official, it is not neeessary for ~he operator, in sending the
same, tq telegraph a description of the seal, or any words or device
thereon, but the' same may be expressed' in the telegraphic copy by
the letters "L. S." or by the word useal."
HistOrical: Rev. St. 1887. Sec. 4895.
C. C. P ..1881, Sec. 691.

California.LegislaUon:

Same:

P. 1872; Sec. 1017; I~eering's Code,
tb.; Kerr's Code, ib.

C.

C.

CHAPTER 6.
OF COSTS.
Section
40900.
4901.
4902,
4903.
4904.
4905,
4906.
4907.
4908.
4909.

Parties entitled to costs,
Allowance to plaintiff.
Same; Several acti')llS m1 8!ngle cause.
'Same: Allowance to defendant.
Discretionary allowanc.e.
Severance of costs.
Costs on appeal. ,
Fees of referees.
Costs of continuance.
.Costs in case of tender.

Section
4910.
4911.
4912.
4913.
4914.
4915.
4916.
4917.
4918.
.4919.

Actions by or aga!ni[lt . administratqrs.. etc:,
C()sts on review. of special proceedings.
.
Taxation of costs,
Same: Costs' on appeal.
Insertion of cos,ts In judgment.
Secur.ity for costs.
Same:· Dlsmis,sal of action.
Costs"against the State.
Costs agaInst the county,
Attorneys fees :Insults for
wages. .

Parties Entitled to Costs.
. . Sec. 4900.. The. m~asure and mode of compensation of attorneys
and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of

the parties; but partes to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs
and disbursements, as hereinafter provided.
.
.
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1>lIS()ELLANEOrrs PROVISIONS.

S1<;O. 689. When a plaintiff ora defendant,
!'Iervire on nOllresidents.
appeared, resides out of the Territory, and has

who has
no attor.
ney in the action or proceeding, the service may be
Where a party made on the Clerk for him. But in all cases where a
has an attorparty has an attorney in the act.ion or proceedinp:, the
ney, service
I,hall be on
such attorney. service of papers, when required, must be upon the attorney instead of the party, except of subprenas, of'
writs,and other process issued in the suit, and of papers to bring him into contempt.! If there be no AttorPreceding pro- lley of record service may be made upon the party.
visions not to
SEC.· 690. The foreO'oing provisions of this Ohapter
apply to pro- d
.
h
"'. ~.
fR'erlillg t l .
0 not apply to t e serVIce of a summons 01' other PI"Obring partv illf
. a par t y mto
.
to contempt,
cess, Or 0 any paper to brmg
con te mpt.
Semee by telaSEC. 691. Any summons, writ, or order in any civil
graph,.
suit or proceeding, and all other papers reqniring service,
may be transmitted by telegraph for service in any place,
and the telegraphic copy of such writ, or order, or paper
so transmitted, lllay be served or executed by the officer
or person to whom it is sent for that pnr.p0se, and returned by him, if any return be requisite, m the same
manner, and wjth the same force and effect in all respects,
as the or.iginal thereof might be if delivered to him, and
the officer or person serving or executing the same has the
same authority, and is suhject to thesfl.me liabilities. as if
the copy were the original. The original, when a writ 01'
order, mnst a.lso be filed in the Court fhnn which it was
issued, and a certified copy thereof must be preserved in
the telegraph office from which it was sent. In sending
it, either the original or the certified copy may be nsed
by the operator for that purpose. Whenever any d()cn~
ment to be sent by telegraph bears a seal, either privllte
or official, it is not necessary for the operator, in sellding
tIle same. to telegraph !l. description of the seal, .01' any
words or device thereon, but the same may be expressed
in the
. copy by the letters "L. S.," or by the

SEO. 692. The measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys' and counselors at law is left to the agreement,
Costs to parties. express or implied, of the parties; hut parties to actions
ngsare. entitled to costs and disbursements,
or
.
COllllwnsation
01 attorneys.

of "ourse to
pJaintifi:

SEO.
tiff~ upon

are
course
a judgment in his favor, in the followhig

cases:
1. In an action for the recovery of real property;
2. In an action to recover the possession of personal
property, where the value of the propertyamOlllJ.ts to
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Tit. XIV.

Ok. VI.

OF COSTS.

pressed in the telegraphic copy by the letters "L S " .' .',
the word "seal."
"
'.

CHAPTER VI.
OF

COSTS.

S1I:CTION

4900. Oompeneation of attorneys. Cost
to parties.
4901. Whena.llowed ofcouroetoplalntl1I.
4902. Several actions brought on a .lng1e
oanse of aotion can earry costs in
but one.
4903. D~~~:,:~ ~~~r:i:,s:~~:.n0Wed
4904. Cool;9, when In the Iiisoretlon 01
4905.
4906.
4907.
4908.

BltCTtON

4909. Costs when a telldt>r Is
suit brought.
4910. Cost. iD. action by or
mlnlstrator, eta.
4911 . Cost. on review other

4912. ]j'nt:~Of an a.1ftda.vltto
4913, Co~:.,~~~eo.l, how
4914. Interest end cos.
t.heoonrt.
When the several 'defenda.nt. a.re
by the Olorlr. in
not united In Inter.st, COlts may
4,916 . w~~::.~~~t~lJ!'~I::".~:'~-~=!3
be severed.
Costs 01 appeal discretionary with
the court in ce.rta.in C8.Ses.
4916.
Beferee. fees.
OontlnU&ll08, oost. may be lmpoBed 4917.·
... condition of.
4918 .

SECTION 4900. The measure and mode of cOlnp~lll8Iiti
, of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the 1Ul"l'P.A,,,:'
express or implied, of the parties; but parties to
proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements,
mafter provided.
SEC. 4901. Costs are allowed of course to the
When allowed of
cour8e to
upon a judgment in his favor, in the following CMes:
pl&lntl1I.
1. In an action for the recOvery of real property;
,
2. In an action to recover the possession of personal
erty where the value of the property amounts to
dred dollars or over; such value shall be d.e,1,erlrnill~
the jury, court, or referee, by whom the action is
3. In an action for the recovery of money or
when plaintiff recovers one hundred dollars or over;
4. In a special proceeding;
5. In an action which ' involves the title or po:sse6s1on~
real estate, or the legality of any tax, uU·IJU"., ass,essII],
toll, or municipal fine.
Sevel'f:l,l aotions
SEC. 4902. When several actions are brought
broughton a
bond, undertakin~, promissory note, bill of
~tf~~ :'~8~~~-ry other instrument In writins-, or in any other' case
costa In but one.
same cause of ,action, agamst several parties
have been joined as defendant in the same action1
can be allowed to the plaintiff in more than one ot
tions, which may be at his election, if the parties
against in the other actions were at the (jUJUWUtUll,;t:lll"'"'-'~
the previous action openly: within this Territory,
disbursements of the plaintIff must be allowed to him in
action.
Defendll.nt's
SEC. 4903. Costs must be allowed, of course, to
costs o.llowoo In fendant upon a judgment in his favor in the actions
oerta:in caaes.
tioned in section 490~t and in special proceedings.
SEC. 4904. In omer actions than those mtm~llOUBU,:;j
Costs, when in
tbe dlacrotloll of section 4901, costs may be allowed or not,
the oourt.
may be apportioned between the parties, on the
verse sides, in the discretion of the court, but
be allowed in an action for the recovery of
ages, when the plaintiff reco~ers less than one
lars, nOr in an ;lction to recover the possession of
548
Compensation
of attorneys
coats fio parties.
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